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Abstract
We discuss the problem of setting prices in an electronic market that has more than one buyer. We
assume that there are self-interested sellers each selling a distinct item that has an associated cost.
Each buyer has a submodular valuation for purchasing any subset of items. The goal of the sellers
is to set a price for their item such that their profit from possibly selling their item to the buyers
is maximized. Our most comprehensive results concern a multi copy setting where each seller has
m copies of their item and there are m buyers. In this setting, we give a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of market clearing pure Nash equilibrium. We also show that not all
equilibria are market clearing even when this condition is satisfied contrary to what was shown in
the case of a single buyer in [2]. Finally, we investigate the pricing problem for multiple buyers in
the limited supply setting when each seller only has a single copy of their item.
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1 Introduction
How should sellers price their items in a market? This is arguably the central question in any
market setting. The emergence of electronic markets has significantly changed the nature of
markets. On the one hand, information collected online has made it possible for vendors to
have detailed information on potential buyers. On the other hand, buyers now have easy
access to the variety of items different sellers have available and their prices. Buyers are
interested in purchasing a bundle of items maximizing their utility for the items purchased.
Sellers are interested in maximizing their profit. Furthermore, the size and speed of online
markets necessitates sellers to set their prices competitively and quickly.
Following Babaioff, Nisan and Paes Leme [2], we will view online markets as a full
information game in which the sellers are the strategic agents. We are therefore interested in
pricing equilibria in combinatorial markets. In a general setting of combinatorial markets
with item pricing, we have many buyers, each having a publicly known valuation function v
for each subset of purchased items, and many strategic sellers, each having a set of items
to sell at a price pi for item i. The utility of a buyer for subset S is v(S) − p(S) where
p(S) =
∑
i∈S pi. In general, the valuation function vj for a buyer j can be quite complicated.
The strategy of each seller is to set prices to maximize the prices for the items they sell.
When items have a cost to produce, the seller wants to maximize their prices minus the
costs for items sold. In this generality, the existence and properties (e.g., uniqueness, market
clearing or not) of possible pure Nash Equilibria (NE) will depend on the precise setting.
The main focus of the Babaioff et al paper is for a single buyer and strategic sellers each
having a single copy of a distinct item. They establish basic results for different classes of
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valuation functions. Namely, they consider (in order of decreasing generality), arbitrary,
subadditive, XOS, submodular, and gross substitutes valuations1. In our setting, we will
restrict attention to submodular valuations and additive valuations. Babaioff et al also
discuss multiple buyers in a Bayesian setting and how their results can be extended in the
case of costs. In a following paper, Lev, Oren and Boutilier [6] consider the setting of a
single monotone submodular buyer where now each seller has a number of different items
for sale. Our contribution will be to further the work of Babaioff et al with regard to more
than one submodular buyer in a full information setting. Our work generalizes the previous
settings in that we have multiple buyers each with their own valuations. We also assume
that sellers have costs to produce an item. We extend the setting of Lev et al to multiple
buyers, but restrict to each seller only selling copies of a distinct item. Hence, overall, our
setting is incomparable to theirs.
2 Related results
Walrus [7] pioneered the study of markets and market equilibrium (for divisible items being
traded) in the late 19th century. Market equilibria is often referred to as competitive
equilibria or Walraisian equlibria. The adaption of markets to buyers (having money)
and sellers (with divisible items) is called Fisher markets (attributed to Irving Fisher and
also dating back to the late 19th century; see Brainard and Scarf [4]). With regard to
indivisible items, Gul and Stracchetti [5] provide a fundamental result showing that the class
of Gross Substitutes valuations (a strict subset of submodular valuations) is the largest class
of valuations containing unit demand buyers that always have a Walraisian equilibrium.
Amongst other conditions, such equilibria require that prices are set so that all items are
sold (i.e., the prices are a market clearing Nash equilibrum).
The topic of pricing is too extensive to indicate all the related work. It is rather remarkable,
however, that precise characterization of pricing equilibria is a relatively recent topic of
interest. As already indicated , our work is most closely related to the comprehensive paper
of Babaioff et al [2] for a single buyer and the following extension by Lev et al [6] to sellers
who can have more than one item for sale. Borodin, Lev and Strangway [3] consider another
extension of Babaioff et al. Namely, they return to a single item per seller and a single buyer
setting but now impose a budget on the buyer. We will not consider budgets although clearly
budgets are an important consideration. Budgets raise many additional considerations for
buyers and the resulting seller prices. This was already evident in the single buyer case.
In our appendix, we will just illustrate how even in a very restricted setting, budgets will
complicate the analysis of possible equilibria for multiple additive buyers.
3 Preliminaries and Summary of Results
We assume thatN = [n] is the set of sellers. Here, we use [l] to denote the set {i ∈ N|1 ≤ i ≤ l}.
We initially assume that seller i sells item i and has k ≤ m copies of this item to possibly
sell to m different buyers. We also assume there is a cost ci to seller i to produce each copy
of their item. Each seller i ∈ N sets a price pi which is same for all copies of item i.
1 A subadditive valuation is such that v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) ∀S, T . A XOS valuation is such that
v(S) = maxt∈I
∑
i∈S wit for wit ∈ R+. A gross substitutes valuation is such that if at a price p, a set
S is purchased and at a price p′ ≥ p, a set S′ is purchased then S ∩ {i|pi = p′i} ⊆ S′. We will not
consider these valuation classes but include these definitions for completeness.
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We assume that M = [m] is the set of buyers and each buyer j ∈M has a submodular
valuation function vj : 2N → R+ where R+ is the set of all non-negative real numbers. We
assume that each buyer is interested in buying at most one copy of each item. A submodular
function v: 2N → R+ is a function such that v(S ∪ {x})− v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {x})− v(T ), ∀S ⊂ T
and x /∈ T . We also assume that vj is normalized (vj(∅) = 0) and monotone (vj(S) ≤ vj(T )
∀S, T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T ). For a given pricing p = {pi}i∈N , the utility of a buyer j ∈M
for a subset S ⊆ N of items is given by uj(S) = vj(S)− p(S) where p(S) =
∑
i∈S pi. Each
buyer j ∈ M chooses a set S(j,p) such that uj(S(j,p)) = maxS{uj(S)|S ⊆ N}. There can
be more than one set that maximizes the utility, in which case a buyer arbitrarily (but
deterministically) chooses a set that has the highest cardinality. Thus every pricing p induces
a given allocation of items Sj,p to each buyer j ∈ M . The social welfare SW (p) of an
allocation induced by a pricing is defined as the sum
∑
j∈M (vj(Sj,p)− c(Sj,p)).
There are different pricing games that can be considered when there are many buyers
and sellers. In the mechanism design area, we usually study combinatorial auctions for a
single seller and multiple buyers who are the strategic agents. In contrast, in the pricing
game as initiated in Babaioff et al, there is one utility maximizing buyer and it is the sellers
who are the strategic agents whose actions consist solely of setting prices. But once there is
a limited supply (i.e., more buyers than copies) of each item, it is not clear which buyers will
obtain a given item. Since we do not view the buyers as being strategic (i.e., their valuations
are true and known), either the sellers or an outside mechanism have to determine an order
in which to serve buyers. That is, we are essentially considering an online algorithm in which
buyers arrive sequentially. In the limited supply case, we will study such an online setting
and leave other extensions for future work.
A pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) of the game is given by a pricing p ∈ (R+)n. Under
this pricing p, no seller can unilaterally increase profit by changing their price. This is an
equilibrium in the game between sellers. The profit of a seller i ∈ N is given by αi(pi − ci)
where αi denotes the number of buyers that buy item i and ci is the cost of production to
seller i. The cost of production to one or more sellers may be 0. A market clearing Pure
Nash Equilibrium is a PNE such that all copies of all the items are sold by the sellers. In
addition to considering the standard Nash equilibrium, we will sometimes consider -Nash
equilibria for sufficiently small  > 0 in which any individual seller cannot gain more than an
additive profit of  by deviating.
Let OPT = maxp SW (p). The price of anarchy (POA) for a market game instance I is
then defined as max{p:p is a PNE} OPTSW (p) . That is, the POA is the worst case approximation
induced by a PNE. The price of stability (POS) is defined as min{p:p is a PNE} OPTSW (p) . That
is, the best case approximation induced by a PNE.
As stated, throughout this paper we assume that the buyer valuation functions vj are
monotone submodular for each j ∈ M . For some results, we further assume that the vj
are additive for one or more buyers. We define vj(i|S) as vj(S ∪ {i}) − vj(S) for S ⊆ N ,
i ∈ N \ S, j ∈M . We denote by vj,i the marginal value vj(i|N \ {i}) = vj(N)− vj(N \ {i})
∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ M . We note that vj(i|S) ≥ vj,i, ∀j ∈ M and ∀S ⊆ N ∀i ∈ N \ S by the
definition of submodularity.
3.1 Summary of results
In sections 4 and 5 (and also Appendix A), we have as many copies of items as we have buyers.
Hence, buyers are never in competition for an item. In sections 4 and 5 we provide a rather
comprehensive set of results including a characterization for when there is a unique market
clearing pure equilibirium and a sufficient condition for when there is a unique equilibrium.
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In the unlimited supply setting with no budgets, we consider the social welfare obtained in
equilibria, and the resulting price of anarchy and price of stability. Appendix A considers
a very restricted setting in which a budget is introduced. In this setting, we do not have
explicit prices but rather we have a set of conditions that can easily be tested and these
conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a market clearing equilibrium.
In section 6, we have a limited supply of items. As stated, we need to have some means
to resolve conflicts amongst the buyers. In particular, we will assume that each seller has
only one copy of their item. We begin with some general observations that hold no matter
how items are allocated to buyers. In section 6.1, we consider the restricted setting where
there is one submodular buyer and the remaining buyers are additive. We assume that the
sellers (or a central authority) have agreed upon a fixed order in which agents arrive and get
their choice of items. The negative results (i.e., Examples 1, 26) therefore hold in the online
setting where an adversary sets the order of arrivals. This is similar to online posted price
mechanisms as studied for the case of a single seller. Here, however, we have more than one
seller and for any positive claims about equilibria, we will assume that buyers arrive in a
fixed order that is known to all sellers.
Our positive results for the limited supply setting as with regard to the existence and
characterization of pure Nash equilibira and market clearing equilibria are restricted to some
very special settings. Our negative examples suggest that any extension of our positive
results to more general markets (with multiple submodular buyers) will not follow in any
immediate way.
As an indication of the difference between previous results for a single buyer discussed in
[2] where there is always a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of submodular valuations, we
provide an example where no -Nash Equilibirum exists in the limited supply setting. In the
following example there is no -Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently small .
I Example 1. Consider the market where M = [2], N = [2] and the valuation function is
given by the following table:
sets 1 2 1, 2
v1 16 16 32
v2 30 30 45
v1 is additive and v2 is submodular as can be easily verified. There is no pure -Nash
equilibrium for  < 7 when buyer 1 is preferred by every seller over buyer 2 at a given pricing
when both the buyers are willing to purchase. At any given pricing, buyer 1 chooses a set
S1 ⊆ N that it consumes, and then buyer 2 chooses a subset of N \ S1 that maximizes its
utility.
Proof. Let  < 7 and suppose there is an -Nash Equilibrium p and under pricing p, S1 is
sold to 1 and N \ S1 to 2. The equilibrium has to be market clearing because each seller can
earn a profit of at least  by selling to buyer 1 at a price of 16.
Let S1 = N and S2 = ∅. Then, p1, p2 ≤ 16 since otherwise buyer 1 will not purchase
those items. Now, if seller 2 increases the price to 30, buyer 1 will purchase set {1} and
buyer 2 will purchase {2} increasing the profit of seller 2 by more than . So, there is no
equilibrium with S1 = N , S2 = ∅.
Let S1 = {1} and S2 = {2}. Then, p1 ≤ 16 since otherwise buyer 1 will not purchase
item 1 and 16 < p2 ≤ 30 since buyer 1 does not purchase but buyer 2 does. If p2 > 23, seller
1 can increase its price to 23 and be sold to buyer 2 increasing the profit by more than .
If p2 ≤ 23, seller 2 can increase the price to 30 and still be sold to buyer 2 increasing the
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profit by more than . A similar thing happens for the case of S1 = {2}, S2 = {1}. So, no
equilibria exists in these cases.
Let S1 = ∅ and S2 = N . Then. p1, p2 ≤ 15 since otherwise the buyer 2 will purchase at
most one item. At this price, buyer 1 will already purchase both the items and hence this
case is not possible.
Thus, an -Nash equilibrium does not exist in this case. J
4 Characterization of Market Clearing Equilibrium in case of two
copies and two submodular buyers
We begin by considering the case of two buyers and two copies of each item, i.e., M = {1, 2}.
In this case, the buyer order does not matter. Also, here market clearing means that each
buyer buys from each seller. We establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of market clearing pure Nash equilibrium as stated in the following theorem, and
proved using observation 6, lemma 7 and lemma 8. The proof of this theorem along with
other proofs in this section are subsumed in section 5 but for notational convenience, we
state them separately.
I Theorem 2. The necessary and sufficient condition in the case of 2 buyers (M = [2] =
{1, 2}) and n sellers (N = [n]) for the existence of a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium
is that ∀i ∈ N v2,i−ci2 ≤ v1,i − ci ≤ 2(v2,i − ci) and min{v1,i, v2,i} ≥ ci. Moreover, when this
condition is satisfied, the market clearing pure Nash equilibrium is unique.
We contrast this theorem by giving an example where the condition is not satisfied and
no -Nash equilibrium exists.
I Example 3. Consider the market where M = [2], N = [2], the cost to sellers is 0 and the
valuation function is given by the following table:
sets 1 2 1, 2
v1 200 210 220
v2 70 50 120
Valuation v1 is submodular and v2 is additive as can be easily verified. We will show that
for  < 5, there cannot be a pure -Nash equilibrium for these valuations.
Proof. Let p be an -Nash equilibrium for some  < 5. Let S1 be the set purchased by buyer
1 and S2 be the set purchased by buyer 2 at this pricing. There are four possibilities for each
S1 and S2 namely N, {1}, {2} and ∅. We will consider all possibilities and in each case show
that some seller can improve upon their revenue by deviating. We do not need to consider
the combinations where S1 ∪ S2 6= N since every seller can sell to buyer 2 by setting a price
50 earning strictly more profit than  and hence S1 ∪ S2 = N .
If S1 = S2 = N , then p1 ≤ 10 since otherwise buyer 1 will prefer {2} over N and hence
seller 1 can profit by more than  by setting a price of 70 and just selling to buyer 2.
If S1 = {1} and S2 = N , then p2 ≤ 50 and p1 ≤ p2 − 10 since otherwise buyer 1 will
prefer {2} over {1}. If p1 > 25 then by setting a price of p1 + 9, seller 2 will earn a profit
of 2p1 +18 > 68 increasing it by more than . If p1 ≤ 25, seller 1 can profit by more than
 by setting a price of 70 and just selling to buyer 2.
The case of S1 = ∅ and S2 = N is not a possible equilibrium since in this case p1 ≤ 70
and hence buyer 1 will prefer {1} over ∅.
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If S1 = {2} and S2 = N , then p1 ≤ 70, p2 ≤ 50 and p1 ≥ p2 − 10 since otherwise buyer 1
will prefer {1} over {2}. If p1 ≤ 60 then by setting a price of 70, seller 1 will increase his
profit by more than . If p2 ≤ 47.5 and p1 > 60, seller 2 can profit by more than  by
setting a price of 50. If p1 > 60 and p2 > 47.5, then by setting a price of 37.5 seller 1 can
sell to both buyers earning a profit of 75 increasing it by at least .
The case of S1 = N and S2 6= N is not possible since in this case p1 ≤ 10 and p2 ≤ 20,
so buyer 2 will purchase N .
If S1 = {2} and S2 = {1}, then p1 ≤ 70 and p2 > 50. By setting a price of 40, seller 1
can sell to both the buyers and earn a profit of 80 increasing the profit by at least .
If S1 = {1} and S2 = {2}, then p1 > 70 and p2 ≤ 50. This case is not possible since at
this pricing, buyer 1 will prefer {2} over {1}.
So, p is not an -Nash equilibrium for  < 5. Since p is arbitrary, there is no -Nash
equilibrium for  < 5. J
We first prove that the given condition is a necessary condition. We start by making
three observations that will be helpful in the proof.
B Observation 4. For a buyer with submodular valuation function v, if some item i has a
price of at most vi = v(i|N \ {i}), the buyer will prefer to purchase item i.
Proof. Let us consider a pricing p such that pi ≤ vi. Let us assume that the buyer will buy a
set S of items that does not contain i under this pricing p. Then, v(i|S) = v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≥
vi ≥ pi (since v is submodular) and hence v(S ∪ {i})− p(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S)− p(S), so under
pricing p, the buyer will prefer to purchase i due to the tie-breaking rule which breaks ties
in favor of larger sets. J
B Observation 5. For a buyer with submodular valuation function v, if some item i has a
price of at most v(i|S) for some S ⊆ N , i /∈ S, the buyer will prefer to purchase S ∪ {i} over
S.
Proof. Let us consider a pricing p such that pi ≤ v(i|S). Then, v(i|S) = v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≥ pi
and hence v(S ∪ {i})− p(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S)− p(S), so under pricing p, the buyer will prefer
to purchase S ∪ {i} over S due to the tie-breaking rule which breaks ties in favor of larger
sets. J
B Observation 6. Let N = [n], M = [2] and suppose there exists i ∈ N such that
min{v1,i, v2,i} < ci. Then, there is no market clearing pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a market clearing pure
Nash equilibrium given by pricing p. pi ≤ v2,i since if pi > v2,i = v2(N) − v2(N \ {i}),
then v2(N \ {i}) − p(N \ {i}) > v2(N) − p(N) since pi = p(N) − p(N \ {i}) and hence
buyer 2 will purchase N \ {i} instead of N . Similarly, pi ≤ v1,i. Thus, profit of seller i is
2(pi − ci) ≤ 2(min{v1,i, v2,i} − ci) < 0 and hence seller i will earn more profit by deviating
to price ci. Since seller i has an incentive to deviate, p is not an equilibrium.
Since p was assumed to be an arbitrary market clearing pure Nash equilibrium, there is
none. J
I Lemma 7. Let N = [n], M = [2] and suppose there exists i ∈ N such that v1,i − ci >
2(v2,i − ci). Then, there is no market clearing pure Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a market clearing pure
Nash equilibrium given by pricing p. pi ≤ v2,i since if pi > v2,i = v2(N)− v2(N \ {i}), then
v2(N \ {i}) − p(N \ {i}) > v2(N) − p(N) since pi = p(N) − p(N \ {i}) and hence buyer 2
will purchase N \ {i} instead of N .
Since p is market clearing, both buyers will purchase all items and hence the profit of
seller i will be 2(pi− ci) ≤ 2(v2,i− ci) < v1,i− ci. If seller i instead sets price p′i = v1,i, buyer
1 will still purchase item i due to observation 4 and new profit of seller i will be v1,i − ci. So,
seller i has an incentive to deviate from p and hence p is not an equilibrium.
Since p was assumed to be an arbitrary market clearing pure Nash equilibrium, there is
none. J
Lemma 7 proves that ∀i ∈ N v1,i − ci ≤ 2(v2,i − ci) is a necessary condition for the
existence of a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium in the case of 2 buyers. Similarly, ∀i ∈ N
v2,i−ci ≤ 2(v1,i−ci) is also a necessary condition. Thus, ∀i ∈ N v2,i−ci2 ≤ v1,i−ci ≤ 2(v2,i−ci)
is a necessary condition for the existence of a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium in the
case of 2 buyers. Also, from observation 6, min{v1,i, v2,i} ≥ ci is a necessary condition. Now,
we will prove that these two conditions together are also a sufficient condition.
I Lemma 8. There is a unique market clearing pure Nash equilibrium p in the case of
M = [2] when ∀i ∈ N v2,i−ci2 ≤ v1,i − ci ≤ 2(v2,i − ci) and min{v1,i, v2,i} ≥ ci. Namely,
pi = min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. Let pi = min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀i ∈ N .
Since ∀i ∈ N pi ≤ v1,i and pi ≤ v2,i, it is clear that both the buyers will purchase all the
items due to observation 4. Thus, there is no profit in reducing the price for any seller. The
profit in this case for seller i is 2(pi − ci) ≥ 0.
Without loss of generality, we consider the case where for some i ∈ N v1,i ≥ v2,i. In this
case, pi = v2,i. Let us assume that seller i increases the price of his item to p′i > pi and this
new pricing is called p′. Let us also assume that buyer 2 purchases a set S containing i
under this new pricing. If S 6= N , then for all j ∈ N \ S, v2(j|S) = v2(S ∪ {j})− v2(S) ≥
v2(N) − v2(N \ j) = v2,j ≥ pj , so v2(S ∪ {j}) − p′(S ∪ {j}) ≥ v2(S) − p′(S) since p′j = pj .
Hence buyer 2 will prefer S ∪{j} over S due to tie-breaking rule. This is a contradiction and
hence S = N . Since p′i > v2,i = v2(N)−v2(N \{i}), v2(N \{i})−p′(N \{i}) > v2(N)−p′(N),
so buyer 2 will not purchase i. Similarly if seller i increases the price to more than v1,i, buyer
1 will not purchase item i. So, the maximum profit that seller i can earn by increasing the
price is v1,i − ci. Since v1,i − ci ≤ 2(v2,i − ci), there is no incentive to increase the price.
Therefore, p is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Let us assume that there is another market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium p′ such
that p′i 6= min{v1,i, v2,i} for some i ∈ N . If p′i > v1,i, then buyer 1 will prefer to buy set
N \ {i} over set N since v1(N)− v1(N \ {i}) = v1,i < p′i = p′(N)− p′(N \ {i}) and hence
v1(N) − p′(N) < v1(N \ {i}) − p′(N \ {i}). Therefore, p′i ≤ v1,i. Similarly, p′i ≤ v2,i. If
p′i < min{v1,i, v2,i}, then by setting price min{v1,i, v2,i}, seller i will still sell both the copies
of his item due to observation 4 and hence will earn strictly more profit. Thus, p′ is not a
market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium if p′i 6= min{v1,i, v2,i} for some i ∈ N .
Hence, p is the unique market clearing pure Nash equilibrium. J
When ci > min{v1,i, v2,i} for some i, there are no market clearing pure Nash equilibria
as stated in Observation 6. Market clearing pure Nash equilibria are also total welfare
maximizing in the case that ∀i ∈ N ci ≤ min{v1,i, v2,i} since total welfare is the sum of the
utility of all buyers and sellers. When buyer 1 buys a set S1 and buyer 2 buys a set S2, the
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money is transferred from buyers to sellers and hence the total welfare is (v1(S1)− p(S1)) +
(v2(S2)− p(S2)) + (p(S1)− c(S1)) + (p(S2)− c(S2)) = v1(S1)− c(S1) + v2(S2)− c(S2) which
is maximum when S1 = S2 = N , that is when the market is cleared. Thus, when market
clearing pure Nash equilibria exists, the price of stability is 1.
For the case of a single submodular buyer, and each seller having a single copy of their
distinct item, Babaioff et al [2] show that there is a unique pure Nash equilibrium (NE)
which is market clearing and that no other pure NE can exist. That is, the one and only
pure Nash is market clearing. We now show that in the setting of two buyers and each seller
having two copies of their item, there can be other Nash equilibrium that are not market
clearing. These non-market clearing NE can exist even when the necessary and sufficient
conditions hold for the unique market clearing NE. Consider the case of two additive buyers,
where v1,i − ci = 2(v2,i − ci) ≥ 0 for some seller i ∈ N , the seller i is indifferent between
setting price v1,i and v2,i since in both cases, the seller will earn equal profit. So, the pure
Nash equilibrium in which it sets a price of v1,i is not market clearing since buyer 2 will
not purchase at this price. So, in case v1,i − ci = 2(v2,i − ci) or 2(v1,i − ci) = v2,i − ci for
some i ∈ N , there are pure Nash Equilibria which are not market clearing. Also in the case
of two additive buyers, if v1,i = v2,i = ci, seller i will always earn non-positive profit and
hence can set any arbitrarily high price, and raising or lowering that price does not increase
the profit of seller i. So in this case as well, there can be many pure Nash Equilibria which
are not market clearing. Furthermore, even if the inequalities in the characterization of
market clearing equilibria are strict inequalities, there can still be pure Nash equilibria that
are not market clearing. That is, even when ∀i ∈ N v2,i−ci2 < v1,i − ci < 2(v2,i − ci) and
min{v1,i, v2,i} > ci, the uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. In particular,
there can sometimes be pure Nash Equilibrium that are non-market clearing when both the
buyers are submodular.
I Example 9. Consider the market where M = [2], N = [3], the cost to sellers is 0 and the
valuation function is given by the following table:
sets 1 2 3 1, 2 1, 3 2, 3 1, 2, 3
v1 90 90 80 100 100 101 110
v2 70 80 85 86 90 100 105
Both the valuation functions are submodular as can be easily verified. The pricing p =
(10, 10, 20) with S1 = {1, 2} and S2 = {2, 3} is a pure Nash equilibrium which is not market
clearing.
In contrast to the previous example, we can show the uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium
when at least one of the valuation functions is additive. Without loss of generality, we assume
that v1 is submodular and v2 is additive.
I Theorem 10. When N = [n], M = [2], v1 is submodular, v2 is additive, and ∀i ∈ N
v2,i−ci
2 < v1,i − ci < 2(v2,i − ci) and min{v1,i, v2,i} > ci then there is only one pure Nash
Equilibrium and that equilibrium is market clearing. This equilibrium is given by pi =
min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. Let p be an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium. For each i ∈ N , pi ≥ min{v1,i, v2,i}
since if pi is smaller than both v1,i and v2,i, seller i can increase the price and still sell to
both the buyers as proved earlier in observation 4. This will only increase his profit.
Let S1 and S2 be the sets purchased by the two buyers respectively. Let i ∈ S2 \ S1 be
arbitrary. Then, pi > v1(i|S1) since otherwise buyer 1 will prefer S1 ∪ {i} over S1 due to
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observation 5. Also, pi = v2,i > v1(i|S1) ≥ v1,i since v2 is additive and hence buyer 2 will
purchase at maximum price v2,i. Since v2,i−ci < 2(v1,i−ci) ≤ 2(v1(i|S1)−ci), it is better for
seller i to set the price equal to p′i = v1(i|S1) since at this price, v1(S1 ∪{i})− p′(S1 ∪{i}) ≥
v1(S1)− p′(S1) due to submodularity and hence in this case both the buyers will purchase
item i due to the tie-breaking rule and seller i will earn more profit. Thus, the set S2 \ S1 is
empty.
If for some seller i, i /∈ S1 ∪ S2, then by setting price pi = min{v1,i, v2,i}, the seller will
sell to both buyers and earn a positive profit. So, S1 ∪ S2 = N in equilibrium. Therefore,
S1 = N .
Let some i ∈ S1 \ S2. In this case, pi ≥ v1,i since otherwise seller i can earn more profit
by increasing the price. Also, pi ≤ v1,i since otherwise N \ {i} is more valuable to buyer 1
than S1 = N . Therefore, pi = v1,i. In this case, v1,i > v2,i and setting price v2,i is more
profitable since by doing so, the profit increases to 2(v2,i − ci) > v1,i − ci. Thus, the set
S1 \ S2 is empty.
Therefore, S1 = S2 = N . Therefore, pi ≤ v2,i and pi ≤ v1,i since otherwise at least
one of the buyers will not purchase i. Hence, pi = min{v1,i, v2,i} gives a unique pure Nash
Equilibrium and this equilibrium is market clearing. J
Note that the price can be as high as v2(i|S2 \ {i}) in case v2 is an arbitrary submodular
valuation and it might hold that v2(i|S2 \ {i})− ci > 2(v1(i|S1)− ci) in which case selling to
both buyers is not profitable for seller i and hence it is not necessary that S2 \ S1 is empty.
Thus, the proof will not follow.
The following corollary follows from the above theorem.
I Corollary 11. When N = [n], M = [2], v1 is submodular, v2 is additive, and ∀i ∈ N
v2,i−ci
2 < v1,i − ci < 2(v2,i − ci) and min{v1,i, v2,i} > ci, the price of anarchy is 1.
5 The Unlimted Supply Setting for an Arbitrary Number of Buyers
Generalising the case of two buyers, the necessary and sufficient condition in case of m buyers
and m copies per seller (i.e., M = [m]) is given by the following theorem. We prove it using
observation 13, lemma 14 and lemma 15. Recall that vj,i = vj(N)− vj(i|N \ {i}) ∀j ∈M
∀i ∈ N .
For all i ∈ N , we define pii to be a permutation of [m] in non-decreasing order of vpii(j),i
(vpii(k),i ≤ vpii(k+1),i ∀k ∈ [m− 1] and hence vpii(1),i = minj vj,i).
I Theorem 12. The necessary and sufficient condition in case of m buyers (M = [m]) and
n sellers (N = [n]) for the existence of a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium is ∀i ∈ N
∀j ∈ [m] vpii(j),i − ci ≤ mm−j+1 (vpii(1),i − ci) and ∀i ∈ N minj∈[m] vpii(j),i ≥ ci.
The necessary condition follows from the following observation and lemma.
B Observation 13. Let N = [n], M = [m] and suppose there exists i ∈ N such that
minj∈[m] vpii(j),i < ci. Then, there is no market clearing pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is a market clearing pure Nash
equilibrium given by pricing p. pi ≤ vpii(j),i since if pi > vpii(j),i = vpii(j)(N)− vpii(j)(N \ {i}),
then vpii(j)(N \ {i})− p(N \ {i}) > vpii(j)(N)− p(N) since pi = p(N)− p(N \ {i}) and hence
buyer pii(j) will purchase N \ {i} instead of N . Thus, pi ≤ minj∈[m] vpii(j),i. Thus, profit of
seller i is m(pi − ci) ≤ m(minj∈[m] vpii(j),i − ci) < 0 and hence seller i will earn more profit
by deviating to price ci. Since seller i has an incentive to deviate, p is not an equilibrium.
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Since p was assumed to be an arbitrary market clearing pure Nash equilibrium, there is
none. J
I Lemma 14. If for some i ∈ N and some j ∈ [m], vpii(j),i − ci > mm−j+1 (vpii(1),i − ci), then
there is no market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let us assume to the contrary that there is a market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium
p. Then, ∀k ∈ N pk ≤ vpik(l),k ∀l ∈ [m] since otherwise some buyer pik(l) will not purchase
item k since the utility from N \ {k} will be strictly higher than from N . Also, ∀k ∈ N
pk ≥ minl∈[m] vpik(l),k since otherwise seller k can increase price and still sell to all the buyers
as shown in observation 4. Therefore, pk = minl∈[m] vpik(l),k = vpik(1),k ∀k ∈ N . Thus, the
profit of seller k under this pricing is m(pk − ck) = m(vpik(1),k − ci).
Now, if seller i deviates to a price of vpii(j),i, it will still sell to m− j +1 buyers since new
price vpii(j),i ≤ vpii(l),i ∀l ≥ j. Thus, the new profit of seller i is (m− j + 1)(vpii(j),i − ci) >
m(vpii(1),i − ci) and hence the seller i has an incentive to deviate. Therefore, p is not a
market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium.
Since p was assumed to be an arbitrary market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium, there is
none. J
The sufficient condition follows from the following lemma.
I Lemma 15. If ∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ [m] vpii(j),i − ci ≤ mm−j+1 (vpii(1),i − ci) and ∀i ∈ N
minj∈[m] vpii(j),i ≥ ci, then there is a unique market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let p be a pricing such that pi = vpii(1),i = mink∈M vk,i ∀i ∈ N .
At this pricing, all the items are sold to all the buyers as shown in observation 4 since
pi ≤ vj,i ∀j ∈M ∀i ∈ N . Thus, no seller has an incentive to lower the price. The profit to
seller i at this pricing is m(vpii(1),i − ci) ≥ 0.
Let us consider that some seller i increases its price to p′i and let the new pricing be
p′. Since p′k ≤ vj,k ∀j ∈ M ∀k ∈ N \ {i}, every buyer will purchase all the items other
than i. Let j be the minimum index such that p′i ≤ vpii(j),i. If there is no such j, then
no buyer will purchase item i and hence this deviation is not profitable to seller i. Item i
will be purchased by m − j + 1 sellers and hence the maximum profit seller i will earn is
(m− j + 1)(p′i − ci) ≤ (m− j + 1)(vpii(j),i − ci) ≤ m(vpii(1),i − ci) = m(pi − ci) and hence it
is not profitable for seller i to deviate.
Thus, p is a market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium.
Let us assume that there is another market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium p′. Since it
is market clearing, p′i ≤ vpii(1),i ∀i ∈ N . If p′i < vpii(1),i for some i, then deviating to price
vpii(1),i is profitable to seller i since it will still sell to all the buyers and hence seller i will
earn strictly more profit at this new price.
Thus, p is the unique market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium. J
We now show that theorem 10 extends to the case of m buyers when at most one of them
is submodular.
I Theorem 16. When N = [n], M = [m], the valuation of one of the buyer is submodular
and the valuations for the remaining buyers are additive, and ∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ [m] vpii(j),i − ci <
m
m−j+1 (vpii(1),i − ci) and ∀i ∈ N vpii(1),i > ci, then there is only one pure Nash Equilibrium
and that equilibrium is market clearing. This equilibrium is given by pi = vpii(1),i ∀i ∈ N .
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Proof. Let p be an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium. For each i ∈ N , pi ≥ vpii(1),i since if pi
is smaller than vpii(1),i, seller i can increase the price and still sell to all the buyers as proved
earlier in observation 4. This will only increase his profit.
Let there be an item i ∈ N that is not purchased by the submodular buyer at pricing p.
Let pii(j) be the submodular buyer for some j ∈ [m]. Then, pi = vpii(k),i for some k > j and
item i is purchased by buyers {pii(l)|k ≤ l ≤ m} (a total of m - k + 1) buyers. Thus, the
profit of seller i is (m− k + 1)(vpii(k),i − ci) < m(vpii(1),i − ci) which will be the profit if the
seller i sets a price of vpii(1),i. Thus, p is not an equilibrium. This is a contradiction and
hence every item is purchased by the submodular buyer in an equilibrium. Therefore, in an
equilibrium, the price of item i is at most vpii(j),i where pii(j) is the submodular buyer.
Let us assume that pi 6= vpii(k),i ∀k ∈ [m] for some i ∈ N . Then, vpii(k),i < pi < vpii(k+1),i
for some k ∈ [m− 1] since vpii(1),i ≤ pi ≤ vpii(m),i. Now if the seller i increases the price to
vpii(k+1),i, the set of buyers that purchase item i does not change and hence the profit of
i increases. Therefore, this is not possible in an equilibrium. Thus, pi = vpii(k),i for some
k ∈ [m] for all i ∈ N .
Let pi = vpii(k),i for some k > 1 for some i ∈ N . Then, the buyers {pii(l)|k ≤ l ≤ m}
purchases the item i and hence the profit of seller i is (m−k+1)(vpii(k),i− ci). The seller can
increase his profit by setting a price of vpii(1),i since m(vpii(1),i−ci) > (m−k+1)(vpii(k),i−ci).
Thus, this is not possible in an equilibrium.
Therefore, pi = vpii(1),i ∀i ∈ N gives the unique pure Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium
is market clearing since all the buyers purchases all the items. J
The following corollary follows from the above theorem.
I Corollary 17. When N = [n], M = [m], the valuation of one of the buyer is submodular
and the valuations for the remaining buyers are additive, and ∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ [m] vpii(j),i − ci <
m
m−j+1 (vpii(1),i − ci) and ∀i ∈ N vpii(1),i > ci, the price of anarchy is 1.
Next we give an example in case of m buyers in which we show that the price of anarchy
can be as high as Hm.
I Example 18. Consider the market where N = {1}, M = [m], vi,1 = 1i ∀i ∈ [m] \ {1},
v1,1 = 1 +  for some  ≥ 0 and c1 = 0. In this case, there is an equilibrium in which
the only seller sets a price of 1 +  and at this price, only buyer 1 purchases. The welfare
of this equilibrium is 1 + . The optimal welfare, however, is Hm +  (where Hm is mth
harmonic number,
∑
i∈[m]
1
i which is approximately logm) which is achieved when all the
buyers purchases the item (at a price at most 1m ). Therefore, for this equilibrium, the welfare
is at most 1+Hm+ of the optimal.
Note that the example above can be extended to the case of n sellers by taking additive
valuations vj(S) = |S|j for all j 6= 1 and v1(S) = |S|(1 + ). In the case  > 0 in the example
above, there is only one equilibrium and the price of anarchy is at least Hm+1+ which is
arbitrarily close to Hm if  is small enough. In the case that  = 0 and the sellers decide to
offer the lowest price that maximizes their profit, the welfare is Hm which is equal to the
optimal welfare, and the price of anarchy in case of this tie breaking rule for sellers is 1.
The following theorem proves that in the case of no production costs, whenever an
equilibrium exists, it has a welfare of at least 1Hm of the optimal welfare and hence the price
of anarchy is bounded by Hm. This bound is tight as shown in the example 18 where there
is an equilibrium with welfare exactly 1Hm of the optimal welfare.
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I Theorem 19. Suppose the set of sellers is N = [n], set of buyers is M = [m] and each
seller i has m copies of a unique item also denoted i with no cost of production. Suppose p
is a pure Nash equilibrium pricing vector under which each buyer j buys the set Sj. Then,∑
j∈M
vj(N) ≤ Hm
∑
j∈M
vj(Sj)
We use the fact v(S) +
∑
i∈T\S v(i|T \ {i}) ≤ v(T ) ≤ v(S) +
∑
i∈T\S v(i|S) for v
submodular and S ⊆ T quiet often in the following proof. This fact follows from the
properties of submodularity.
Proof. Let U =
⋃m
j=1 Sj and j ∈ M be fixed. Note that for all i ∈ N \ U , we have
vj(i|Sj) = 0 (otherwise, seller i could have made non-zero profit by setting pi = vj(i|Sj) due to
observation 5). Hence, vj(N) ≤ vj(U)+
∑
i∈N\U vj(i|U) ≤ vj(U)+
∑
i∈N\U vj(i|Sj) = vj(U).
Now, monotonicity implies that vj(N) = vj(U). So, if we show that
∑
j∈M vj(U) ≤
Hm
∑
j∈M vj(Sj), we are done.
Given i ∈ N and j ∈M , define
buy(i) = |j ∈M : i ∈ Sj |,
rank(j, i) = |j′ ∈M : vj′(i|Sj′ \ {i}) ≥ vj(Sj \ {i})|.
Note that buy(i) is the number of buyers who are currently buying from seller i, and
rank(j, i) is the number of buyers who would buy from seller i if his price was equal to
vj(i|Sj \ i). Also, note that the current profit of buyer i is buy(i)pi.
Note that for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M such that i /∈ Sj , we must have rank(j, i)vj(i|Sj) ≤
buy(i)pi (otherwise seller i could profit more by setting her price vj(i|Sj)). Hence, vj(i|Sj) ≤
buy(i)pi
rank(j,i) . Now, fix j ∈M and note that
vj(U) ≤ vj(Sj) +
∑
i∈U\Sj
vj(i|Sj)
≤ vj(Sj) +
∑
i∈U\Sj
buy(i)pi
rank(j, i)
Taking sum over j ∈M , we have∑
j∈M
vj(U) ≤
∑
j∈M
vj(Sj) +
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈U\Sj
buy(i)pi
rank(j, i)
=
∑
j∈M
vj(Sj) +
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈M :i/∈Sj
buy(i)pi
rank(j, i)
=
∑
j∈M
vj(Sj) +
∑
i∈U
buy(i)pi(Hm −Hbuy(i))
≤
∑
j∈M
vj(Sj) + (Hm − 1)
∑
i∈U
buy(i)pi,
where the third transition (second equality) holds because the buyers who do not buy from
seller i have ranks buy(i) + 1, . . . , m, and the final transition (second inequality) holds
because i ∈ U implies buy(i) ≥ 1(and thus Hbuy(i) ≥ 1).
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It remains to show that
∑
i∈U buy(i)pi ≤
∑
j∈M vj(Sj). To see this, fix j ∈M and note
that
vj(Sj) ≥
∑
i∈Sj
vj(i|Sj \ {i}) ≥
∑
i∈Sj
pi.
Summing over j ∈M , we get that∑
j∈M
vj(Sj) ≥
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Sj
pi =
∑
i∈U
buy(i)pi,
as desired. J
6 The case of a single copy of each item and multiple buyers
In contrast to the results of Babaioff et al [2] for a single buyer, and our results in sections 4
and 5, the question of equilibria becomes more nuanced for multiple buyers with submodular
valuations when each seller has a single copy of their item. We start by showing that the
problem of pricing in the case of a single copy with costs to sellers reduces to the problem
of pricing in the case of single copy with no costs to sellers and having one extra additive
buyer. Conversely, if one of the buyer is additive and there are no costs to sellers, this can
be reduced to the problem of one less buyer and costs to sellers.
Let N = [n] and M = [m] be the set of sellers and buyers respectively, with ci the cost of
production to seller i. We also assume that each seller only produces one copy of their item.
Let this problem be denoted by P = (N,M, c, {vj}mj=1) where vj is the valuation function
of buyer j. We construct an equivalent problem P ′ = (N ′,M ′, {v′j}m+1j=1 ) where v′j = vj for
j ≤ m is the valuation of buyer j, N ′ = N , M ′ = [m+ 1] and v′m+1 is an additive valuation
of buyer m + 1 with vm+1,i = ci ∀i ∈ [n]. In P ′ we assume that at any given pricing, an
item is sold to buyer m+ 1 only if no one else purchases it. Note that there is no cost of
production in P ′. The following observation proves that P and P ′ are equivalent.
I Lemma 20. Assuming that item i not being sold implies pi = ci, there is a one-to-one
correspondence in the equilibria in P and P ′.
Proof. If profit to seller i under p in P is 0, then it will earn exactly ci profit in P ′ by selling
to buyer m+ 1. If profit to seller i under p in P is not 0, the same buyer will still purchase
in P ′ but there will be no cost of production, so the profit will be ci more. By selling to
someone else, the profit will not change. If some seller can earn more profit by increasing its
price in P , the same seller can earn more profit in P ′ since the difference in profit is constant
at the same price; hence there is a one-to-one correspondence in the equilibria between P
and P ′. J
Note that we have not made any assumptions on the valuation functions of the buyers or
their budgets. Given lemma 20 and the fact that P ′ has no costs of production, with the
exception of Corollary 24, we will assume in this section that costs to sellers is zero.
Without loss of generality, we assume that for each i ∈ N , ∃j ∈ M such that vj,i > 0.
The first observation that we make is that all equilibria are market clearing. For this, we do
not assume any restrictions on the buyers other than that all buyers are submodular and
there are no costs to sellers. There may or may not be more than one submodular buyers.
B Observation 21. If p is an -Nash Equilibrium (for  < mini∈N{maxj∈M vj,i}) in the
case of m buyers when their valuation functions are submodular and each seller has a single
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copy of their unique item, then p is market clearing. It also follows that every pure Nash
equililibrium is market clearing since it is a special case with  = 0.
Proof. Let us assume that at pricing p, the item of seller i is not being sold. Then,
pi > maxj∈M{vj,i} > 0. By setting a price of maxj∈M{vj,i}, the seller will sell his item at a
price more than  and hence this deviation is profitable. So, p is not an -Nash Equilibrium.
This is a contradiction, and hence the item of seller i is sold. Since i is arbitrary, p is market
clearing. J
The assumption of submodularity is required in the previous observation as illustrated in
the following example. Without this assumption, there is no guarantee that the market will
be cleared.
I Example 22. Let us assume that there is a single buyer with valuation v(1) = v(2) =
12, v(3) = 19, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 20 and v({1, 2, 3}) = 30. It is easily verified
that v is subadditive. Let us assume that sellers set price p1 = p2 = p3 = 9. In this case,
the buyer will purchase {3} even though pi < v(i|{1, 2, 3} \ {i}) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Note that this
pricing is not a pure Nash equilibrium. This shows that a price less than marginal value is
not sufficient for the clearing of market if the buyers are not submodular.
6.1 One submodular buyer with multiple additive buyers
We will now consider a special case in which there is only one buyer who has an arbitrary
submodular valuation function while the other buyers have additive valuations.
First we note that in the particular case when all the vj are additive, there is an equilibrium
where the seller i sets a price of maxj∈M{vj,i}. This follows since the seller only has one copy
of his item to sell, so the seller will sell it to the one who is willing to pay the highest price.
Now, we consider the case of m buyers when v1 is submodular and vj is additive for
2 ≤ j ≤ m. This problem has an -Nash Equilibrium which is proved in the following theorem.
The proof is similar to the one in [2] in which they prove the existence of -Nash Equilibrium
in the case of one submodular buyer and costs to sellers. Similar to them, we assume that the
map that chooses the set purchased by buyer 1 is up-consistent. An up-consistent map is one
in which if price of an item i is increased, either the same set is chosen or item i is not chosen.
One of the examples of an up-consistent map is a map that chooses lexicographically the first
set (the set that comes first in the alphabetical order if the set of alphabets is N and i comes
before j if and only if i < j) as shown in [2]. Gross-substitutes is a stronger condition than
up-consistency since in the former, the items whose price is not changed are sold irrespective
of whether the item whose price is increased is sold or not. Also, gross-substitutes condition
holds when pricing of multiple items is increased at once which might not be the case for an
up-consistent map.
I Theorem 23. When N = [n], M = [m], the first buyer is submodular and the remaining
buyers are additive, then for any  > 0 there is a market clearing -Nash equilibrium in the
game of pricing between sellers when the map of buyer 1 is up-consistent. We assume that,
at any given price, sellers prefer to sell their item to j over k if j < k.
Proof. We begin by setting prices pi = maxj∈M\{1} vj,i ∀i ∈ N . We find a set S under the
pricing ip = p = {pi}ni=1 that is purchased by buyer 1. While there is a seller i that can
increase the price to p′i which is at least pi +  such that at this new pricing p′ = (p′i, p−i),
the item of seller i is sold, we update the price to pi+  and proceed. This process terminates
since item i ∈ S is sold at a maximum price of v1(i).
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Initially at price ip, all the items are sold. Therefore, the profit of seller i ismaxj∈M\{1} vj,i
∀i ∈ N . Now, if some seller’s price is updated, their profit increases since they increase the
price only if they are still able to sell to buyer 1. And if price of seller i is increased, every
other seller still has their item sold since the map of buyer 1 is up-consistent. Let this final
pricing be fp. We claim that fp is an -Nash equilibrium.
At price fp, all the items are sold since they were sold in the beginning and increasing the
price does not change the fact due to up-consistency. Therefore, no seller has an incentive to
lower the price. If there is some seller i that sells to buyer 1 that can increase his profit by
more than  by increasing the price of his item, the price would have increased by at least
 and item i would still have been sold contradicting the definition of fp. If there is some
seller i that does not sell to buyer 1, buyer 1 would not purchase even if the seller increases
the price of his item, and no other buyer will purchase at a price more than his current price
maxj∈M\{1} vj,i and thus it is not beneficial for the seller to increase the price. Therefore, fp
is an -Nash equilibrium. Since all the items are sold, this equilibrium is market clearing. J
Example 1 does not obey Theorem 23 because in contrast to the Theorem, the additive
buyer is preferred over the submodular buyer by the sellers in the example.
Now, we give a corollary for the case when sellers have costs of production. The following
corollary follows immediately from Theorem 23 and Lemma 20.
I Corollary 24. When N = [n], M = [m], the first buyer is submodular and the remaining
buyers are additive, and there are possible costs of production to sellers, then there is an
-Nash equilibrium in the game of pricing between sellers when the map of buyer 1 is up-
consistent. We assume that, at any given price, sellers prefer to sell their item to j over k if
j < k.
Note that in the case of production costs, the equilibria might not be market clearing if
the costs are sufficiently high.
Now we give two examples that do not follow from Theorem 23 since the theorem does
not say anything about pure Nash equilibria. We give an example where pure Nash equilibria
exists and an example where it does not.
Now, we will give an example of a market and a pure Nash Equilibrium in it.
I Example 25. Consider the market where M = [2], N = [3] and the valuation function is
given by the following table:
sets 1 2 3 1, 2 1, 3 2, 3 1, 2, 3
v1 110 112 114 123 125 127 136
v2 10 12 14 22 24 26 36
v1 is submodular and v2 is additive as can be easily verified. p = (10, 12, 14) is the unique
pure Nash Equilibrium and this equilibrium is market clearing when buyer 1 is preferred by
every seller over buyer 2 at any given pricing if both the buyers are willing to purchase. We
see that ∀i, pi = v2,i > v1,i gives the unique pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash Equilibrium p and under pricing p, S1 is sold to 1 and
N \ S1 to 2.
If S1 = ∅, then pi = v2,i ∀i ∈ N and at this price, buyer 1 will prefer {1} over ∅ and
hence this case is not possible.
If S1 = {1}, then p2 = 12 and p3 = 14 since they are sold to buyer 2. Also, p1 = 10 since
if p1 > 10, buyer 1 will prefer to buy 2 over 1 and if p1 < 10, 1 can increase its price to 10
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and still be sold. In this case, buyer 1 will buy {1, 2} over 1 since it gives him more utility.
So, this case is not possible. Similarly, the cases S1 = {2} and S1 = {3} are not possible.
If S1 = {1, 2}, then p3 = 14 since it is sold to buyer 2. Also, p1 ≥ 10 and p2 ≥ 12 since
otherwise they can increase their price and still be sold to buyer 2. The utility of buyer 1
from {1, 2} is 123− p1 − p2 and from {2, 3} is 127− p3 − p2 = 113− p2, so if p1 > 10, buyer
1 will prefer {2, 3} over {1, 2}. So, p1 = 10. Similarly, p2 = 12. The same thing happens for
the other cases when |S1|= 2.
If S1 = N , then pi ≥ v2,i ∀i since otherwise some seller can increase price to get more
profit. At this price, utility from S1 is 136−p1−p2−p3 = 123−p1−p2+13−p3 < 123−p1−p2
and hence buyer 1 will prefer {1, 2} over N , so this case is not possible. J
In the following example, there is no pure Nash equilibrium. A similar example for the
case of costs to sellers was discussed in [2]. In this example, we see the sufficient condition
for multiple copies case (∀i ∈ N v1,i2 ≤ v2,i ≤ 2v1,i) is satisfied but that does not guarantee
the existence of pure Nash Equilibrium in the case of a single copy which exists in the case
of two copies.
I Example 26. Consider the market where M = [2], N = [2] and the valuation function is
given by the following table:
sets 1 2 1, 2
v1 14 14 25
v2 10 12 22
v1 is submodular and v2 is additive as can be easily verified. If buyer 1 prefers to buy item 2
over item 1, there is no pure Nash equilibrium when buyer 1 is preferred by every seller over
buyer 2. Note that the map of buyer 1 is up-consistent.
Proof. Let p be a pricing with min{p1, p2} > 12. In this case, buyer 2 will not purchase
anything. Also, buyer 1 will not purchase both the items since the utility from purchasing item
1 is 14−p1 and utility from purchasing both the items is 25−p1−p2 = 14−p1+11−p2 < 14−p1.
Thus, at least one of the sellers whose item is not sold, has an incentive to set price v2,i to
receive a higher profit.
Let p be a pricing with p1 < p2 and p1 ≤ 12. Then, seller 1 can increase the price to
some number between p1 and p2 which is less than 14 and still sell to buyer 1. Thus, the
seller has an incentive to increase the price.
Let p be a pricing with p2 < p1 and p2 ≤ 12. Then, seller 2 can increase the price to
some number between p2 and p1 which is less than 14 and still sell to buyer 1. Thus, the
seller has an incentive to increase the price.
Let p be a pricing with p1 = p2 < 12. Then, seller 2 can set price to 12 and still be sold
to buyer 2, thus increasing profit.
Let p be the pricing with p1 = p2 = 12. Then, the buyer 1 will purchase only item 2 and
hence seller 1 has an incentive to deviate to a price less than 12 giving him positive profit.
Since in all cases, there is an incentive to someone to change their price, there is no pure
Nash equilibrium. J
The previous example shows that if all sellers have agreed on the same ordering of buyers,
then there might not be a pure Nash Equilibrium. In the following example we provide a
game in which each seller sets both their price and their preference for whom to sell. We
show that this game also does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
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I Example 27. Consider the market where M = [2], N = [3] and the valuation function is
given by the following table:
sets 1 2 3 1, 2 1, 3 2, 3 1, 2, 3
v1 16 16 16 30 30 30 43
v2 17 17 17 31 31 31 43
v1 and v2 are submodular as can be easily verified. We consider the game in which each
seller sets a price along with his own preference over buyers. We prove that there is no pure
Nash equilibrium in this game for the valuations considered.
Proof. Suppose there is a pure Nash equilibrium given by pricing p and some preferences of
sellers. p1, p2, p3 ≥ 13 since at a price of 13 for item i, the buyer 1 always purchases item i
since v1,i = 13. Therefore, the item of each seller is sold at equilibrium.
Let us assume that p1 > 14. Then, the buyer that purchases item 1 will not purchase
any other item since vj(1|{2}) = vj(1|{3}) = 14 for both j = 1 and j = 2. Without loss of
generality, let buyer 2 purchases item 1. Then, the other buyer (buyer 1) will purchase item
2 and 3. Thus, the price of item 2 and 3 will be at most 14. Seller 2 and 3 prefers buyer 1
over buyer 2 since otherwise buyer 2 will purchase one of them instead of 1. Now, seller 2
can deviate to a price between 14 and p1 and prefer buyer 2 over buyer 1 resulting in selling
item to buyer 2 at an increased price resulting in more profit. Thus, there is no equilibrium
where p1 > 14. By symmetry, p1, p2, p3 ≤ 14.
Now, we consider various cases. The first case is when all sellers prefer buyer i over 3 - i.
In this case, one of the sellers can deviate to a price of 16 and prefer to sell to buyer 3 - i.
This will let him profit more.
The second case is when two sellers prefer buyer i and third seller prefer buyer 3 - i. Since
all the prices are at most 14, the third seller can deviate to price of 16 and still sell to buyer
3 - i earning strictly more profit.
Irrespective of pricing and preferences, there is always a strictly profitable deviation to at
least one of the seller and hence there is no pure Nash equilibrium. J
7 Conclusion and Open problems
We have begun an extension of the pricing game for sellers when there are multiple submodular
buyers and sellers have costs to produce their item. When there is enough supply (i.e., at
least as many copies of each seller’s item as number of buyers), then we have a reasonably
clear understanding of equilibria and market clearing equilibria. Once we have a limited
supply, we are far from a good understanding of when we do and when we do not have pure
Nash equilibria. It is clear that having multiple submodular buyers (with or without budgets)
and multiple sellers with costs to produce their items, raises challenges that have not been
present in previous market pricing analysis where there is a single buyer.
At a very general level, there are two obvious questions to pursue. First, in the full
information setting, what conditions make it possible to have well-defined characterizations
for when pure equlibria (and market clearing equilibria) exist? And given that pure equilibria
exist, what can one say about the price of anarchy and price of stability in more general
settings. In particular, the limited supply setting creates the most challenges. A second basic
question is whether there are natural and efficient ways to arrive at equilibria when sellers
do not precisely know the buyer valuations and yet such equilibria are known to exist as in
the unlimited item case when there are no budgets. A third basic question concerns any of
our multi-buyer settings when we further introduce buyer budgets as studied in Borodin et
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al [3] for the single buyer setting. In Appendix A, we provide an equlibrium result for a very
restricted unlimited supply setting, namely where there is one additive buyer with a budget
and one additive buyer without a budget. We do not know if there is always an equilibrium
when all buyers have additive valuations and budgets. A fourth basic question is what results
might hold for more general cost functions (e.g., monotone submodular cost functions).
Given that there are so many directions for future work, it is perhaps best to start with
some specific questions where we are most likely to make progress. In that regard, one
specific question relating to the limited item setting in section 6.1 is whether there is a “best
order” for buyer arrival in the sense that for every instance of submodular buyer valuations,
there is an ordering of the buyers that will allow sellers to have (market clearing) equilibirum
prices. That is, given this best ordering of arrival, buyers will take any available item that
is priced at or below their valuation. Finally, we note that our tie-breaking rule for buyers
is to always break ties in favor of maximum cardinality (and arbitrarily amongst sets of
equal size). This implies that a buyer will purchase an item even if the price is equal to the
marginal value of the item. This is precisely the idea of a “selfish agent” as studied in Azar
et al [1] in the context of unit demand buyers (i.e. bipartite matching) and social welfare
whereas our primary consideration concerns more general submodular valuations and seller
profit. It would be interesting to study other tie-breaking rules such as breaking ties in favor
of minimum size which would imply that a buyer will not purchase unless there is a positive
increase in his utility.
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A A set of conditions characterizing market clearing equilibrium in
case of two additive buyers, one with and one without a budget
As evidenced in the single buyer case studied in Borodin et al [3], the introduction of budgets
changes the nature of equilibria when we add budgets. In this appendix, we consider one
limited scenario where we can characterize the set of Nash equilibria. Namely, we consider
the case of two additive buyers, one of whom (buyer 1) is budgeted (with a budget B). We
assume that there are two copies of each item and there are no costs of production to sellers.
We start by making an observation about when the item will not be sold to buyer 1.
B Observation 28. If for some i ∈ N , v2,i > 2v1,i; then the item i will not be sold to buyer 1
in any equilibrium.
Proof. At any pricing p at which item i is sold to buyer 1, the price is at most v1,i and
hence the profit of seller i is at most 2v1,i. If seller i deviates to a price of v2,i, it will still
sell to buyer 2 and hence earn a profit of v2,i. Thus, no pricing at which item i is sold to
buyer 1 is a pure Nash Equilibrium since seller i has an incentive to deviate. J
The case v2,i > 2v1,i is therefore relatively uninteresting and hence we assume that
v2,i ≤ 2v1,i for all i for further discussion. Let us denote by S1 the set of items purchased by
buyer 1 and S2 purchased by buyer 2. We will now make a further series of observations
leading us to a set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for obtaining a market
clearing Nash equilibirum.
B Observation 29. If p is a pure Nash Equilibrium, i ∈ S1 and pi 6= v2,i for some i ∈ N ,
then v1,i − pi = minj∈S1(v1,j − pj).
Proof. If j ∈ S1, then v1,j − pj ≥ 0 since otherwise buyer 1 has more utility not purchasing
item j. Let us assume to the contrary that v1,i − pi > minj∈S1(v1,j − pj). Let k ∈ S1 be
such that v1,k − pk = minj∈S1(v1,j − pj). We consider two cases: either pi < v2,i or pi > v2,i.
We first consider the case pi < v2,i. Then, if seller i deviates to a price p′i = min{pi +
(v1,i−pi)−(v1,k−pk)
2 , v2,i, B −
∑
j∈S1\{i,k} pj}, at this new pricing p′, item i will be purchased
by buyer 2. It will also be purchased by buyer 1 since v1,i−p′i ≥ (v1,i−pi)+(v1,k−pk)2 > v1,k−p′k
and
∑
j∈S1\{k} p
′
j ≤
∑
j∈S1\{k,i} pj +B −
∑
j∈S1\{i,k} pj ≤ B. Thus, the profit of seller i is
increased.
Next we consider the case pi > v2,i. Then, if seller i deviates to a price p′i = min{pi +
(v1,i−pi)−(v1,k−pk)
2 , B −
∑
j∈S1\{i,k} pj}, at the new pricing p′, item i will be purchased by
buyer 1 since v1,i − p′i ≥ (v1,i−pi)+(v1,k−pk)2 > v1,k − p′k and
∑
j∈S1\k p
′
j ≤
∑
j∈S1\{k,i} pj +
B −∑j∈S1\{i,k} pj ≤ B. Thus, the profit of seller i is increased.
Thus, there is an incentive to deviate in both case and hence p is not an Equilibrium.
This is a contradiction and hence v1,i − pi = minj∈S1(v1,j − pj). J
From the above observation, it is clear that in any equilibrium either the price of an
item i will be equal to v2,i or it will be equal to v1,i −minj∈S1(v1,j − pj). Let us investigate
market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium. One of the necessary conditions for the existence of
market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium is v2,i ≤ 2v1,i which follows from observation 28. Let
us assume that i < j =⇒ v1,i − v2,i ≥ v1,j − v2,j ∀i, j ∈ N without loss of generality. Then,
we have the following observation.
B Observation 30. If p is a market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium such that for some item
i ∈ N , pi = v2,i then pj = v2,j ∀j < i.
CVIT 2016
23:20 Electronic markets with multiple submodular buyers
Proof. Let us assume that for some j < i, pj 6= v2,j . Then, we have v1,j−pj = mink∈N (v1,k−
pk) from observation 29. Therefore, v1,j−pj ≤ v1,i−pi = v1,i−v2,i and since j < i, therefore
v1,j − v2,j ≥ v1,i − v2,i and hence v1,j − pj ≤ v1,j − v2,j . Thus, pj ≥ v2,j . Since pj 6= v2,j ,
pj > v2,j and hence item j will not be purchased by buyer 2 under pricing p. This is a
contradiction to the fact that p is a market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium. J
By a similar argument as above, it follows that if v1,i − v2,i = v1,j − v2,j and pi = v2,i
then pj = v2,j . Thus, there exists a k ∈ N such that ∀i ≤ k pi = v2,i and ∀i > k
pi = v1,i −minj∈N (v1,j − pj). We will refer to this k as the boundary of price assignment.
Using these observations, we can check for the existence of market clearing Nash Equilibria.
Firstly, we check that v2,i ≤ 2v1,i ∀i ∈ N . This is a necessary condition as shown in
observation 28. There can be two types of equilibrium: the one in which budget is consumed
by buyer 1 and the one in which it is not.
We start with checking the case in which budget is not consumed. The boundary k in
this case is the largest index i such that v1,i − v2,i > 0. We check the following conditions.
B Conditions 1. The following conditions are required for the case where budget is not
consumed.
v2,i ≤ 2v1,i ∀i ∈ N∑
i∈N pi < B (to ensure that we are in the non-budget consuming case)
pi = min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀i ∈ N
For all i, A ⊆ [k] \ {i} such that pi = v2,i, v1,i > 2v2,i and 2v2,i +
∑
j∈[k]\(A∪{i}) v2,j < B
it must be that
∑
j∈A(v1,j − v2,j) ≥ v1,i − 2v2,i (we are ensuring that if seller i increases
the price to more than 2v2,i, buyer 1 will not gain more utility by still purchasing item i
and not purchasing some other items)
I Lemma 31. For a pricing p with
∑
i∈N pi < B, if p is a market clearing pure Nash
equilibrium then set of conditions 1 is satisfied.
Proof. Let p be a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium such that
∑
i∈N pi < B. If pi > v1,i
or pi > v2,i for some i, one of the buyer will not purchase i contradicting that p is market
clearing. Thus, pi ≤ min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀i ∈ N . If pi < min{v1,i, v2,i} for some i ∈ N , then seller
i can set the price to p′i = min{v1,i, v2,i, B−
∑
j∈N\{i}} and his item will still be sold to both
the buyers since
∑
j∈N p
′
j ≤ B and p′j ≤ min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀j ∈ N contradicting that p is an
equilibrium because there is a profitable deviation for seller i. Therefore, pi = min{v1,i, v2,i}
∀i ∈ N .
Let there exists i ∈ N and A ⊆ [k]\{i} such that v1,i > 2v2,i, 2v2,i+
∑
j∈[k]\(A∪{i}) v2,j <
B and
∑
j∈A(v1,j − v2,j) < v1,i− 2v2,i. Let the seller i deviates to a price p′i strictly between
2v2,i and min{v1,i, B−
∑
j∈[k]\(A∪{i}) v2,j , v1,i−
∑
j∈A(v1,j−v2,j)}. Let the buyer 1 purchases
set S not containing i at this new pricing. Then,
∑
j∈(S\A)∪{i} p
′
j ≤
∑
j∈[k]\A p
′
j ≤ B and∑
j∈(S\A)∪{i} v1,j − p′j ≥
∑
j∈S(v1,j − p′j)−
∑
j∈A(v1,j − p′j) + (v1,i − p′i) >
∑
j∈S(v1,j − p′j)
and therefore buyer 1 will always purchase item i at this new pricing. Therefore, it is
profitable for seller i to deviate and hence p is not a pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, the last
condition must be satisfied for p to be a pure Nash equilibrium. J
I Lemma 32. For a pricing p with
∑
i∈N pi < B, if set of conditions 1 is satisfied, then p
is a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since pi = min{v1,i, v2,i} ∀i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N pi < B, all the copies of all the items is
sold and hence no seller has an incentive to lower the price. Also, since v2,i ≤ 2v1,i, a seller
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with price v1,i has no incentive to increase the price. Similarly, if v1,i ≤ 2v2,i for some seller
i, the seller does not have an incentive to increase the price.
If v1,i > 2v2,i for some seller i, the only possible increase in profit is when seller i sets a
price of v1,i ≥ p′i > 2v2,i. Let us assume that buyer 1 purchases a set S containing i at this
new pricing. Let A = [k] \ (S ∪ {i}). Then, ∑j∈[k]\{i} p′j < B and ∑j∈[k]\{i}(v1,j − p′j) =∑
j∈A(v1,j−p′j)+
∑
j∈S\{i}(v1,j−p′j) >
∑
j∈S(v1,j−p′j) since A satisfies the condition of the
lemma. Therefore, buyer 1 will prefer [k] \ {i} over S. Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Since no seller has an incentive to deviate, p is a pure Nash equilibrium. J
We also check the case in which the budget is consumed. In this case, the pricing is done
using a boundary k of price assignment. We iterate over all k ∈ N ∪ {0} and for each k, we
create a new pricing pk with pk,i = v2,i ∀i ≤ k and pk,i =
(n−k)v1,i−
∑n
j=k+1
v1,j−
∑k
j=1
v2,j+B
n−k
∀i > k (this pricing comes from the fact that v1,i − pi = v1,j − pj ∀i, j > k). We check the
following conditions for this pricing.
B Conditions 2. The following conditions are required for the case where budget is consumed.
These conditions need to be satisfied for some k ∈ [n] ∪ {0}.
∀i ∈ N v1,i ≥ pk,i ≥ 0
∀i ∈ N v2,i ≤ 2pk,i (otherwise seller i can set price to be v2,i and earn more profit by
selling to buyer 2)
v1,k+1 − v2,k+1 < v1,k+1 − pk,k+1 ≤ v1,k − v2,k
For all i, A ⊆ [k] \ {i}, C ⊆ [n] \ [k] such that pk,i = v2,i, v1,i − 2v2,i > v1,k+1 − pk,k+1,
2v2,i+
∑
j∈[k]\(A∪{i}) v2,j +
∑
j∈[n]\([k]∪C) pk,j < B it must be that
∑
j∈A∪C v1,j − pk,j ≥
v1,i − 2v2,i.
The proofs for the following two lemmas are similar to lemmas 31 and 32.
I Lemma 33. For a pricing p with
∑
i∈N pi = B, if p is a market clearing pure Nash
equilibrium then for some k ∈ [n] ∪ {0} p = pk and set of conditions 2 is satisfied.
Proof. Let p be a pure Nash equilibrium such that
∑
i∈N pi = B. Then following observations
29 and 30, there exists k such that pi = v2,i ∀i ∈ [k] and v1,i−pi = v1,i+1pi+1 ∀i ∈ [n−1]\ [k].
Since
∑
i∈N pi = B, we have ∀i ∈ [n]\ [k]
∑
j∈[n]\[k] v1,i− (n−k)(v1,i−pi) = B−
∑
j∈[k] v2,j
and hence pi =
(n−k)v1,i−
∑n
j=k+1
v1,j−
∑k
j=1
v2,j+B
n−k = pk,i ∀i ∈ [n] \ [k]. Therefore, pi = pk,i
∀i ∈ [n].
∀i ∈ N v1,i ≥ pi holds since otherwise if v1,i < pk,i, buyer 1 will not purchase i
contradicting that p is market clearing. Also, ∀i ∈ N pi ≥ 0 since otherwise seller i can
deviate to 0 price and earn more profit. ∀i ∈ N v2,i ≤ 2pi since otherwise some seller i
can deviate to a price of v2,i and sell just to buyer 2 earning more profit. The condition
v1,k+1 − v2,k+1 < v1,k+1 − pk+1 follows from the fact that pk+1 < v2,k+1 since otherwise it
contradicts the definition of boundary pricing. v1,k+1 − pk+1 < v1,k − pk must hold because
of observation 29.
Now, let us assume that there exists i ∈ [k], A ⊆ [k] \ {i}, C ⊆ [n] \ [k] such that v1,i −
2v2,i > v1,k+1− pk+1, 2v2,i+
∑
j∈[k]\(A∪{i}) v2,j +
∑
j∈[n]\([k]∪C) pj < B and
∑
j∈A∪C(v1,j −
pj) < v1,i − 2v2,i. Let the seller i deviates to a price p′i strictly between 2v2,i and min{v1,i −
v1,k+1 + pk+1, B−
∑
j∈[k]\(A∪{i}) v2,j −
∑
j∈[n]\([k]∪C) pj , v1,i−
∑
j∈A∪C(v1,j − pj)}. Let the
buyer 1 purchases set S not containing i at this new pricing. Then,
∑
j∈(S\(A∪C))∪{i} p
′
j ≤∑
j∈[k]\A p
′
j +
∑
j∈[n]\([k]∪C) p
′
j ≤ B and
∑
j∈(S\(A∪C))∪{i}(v1,j − p′j) ≥
∑
j∈S(v1,j − p′j) −∑
j∈A∪C(v1,j −p′j)+ (v1,i−p′i) >
∑
j∈S(v1,j −p′j) and therefore buyer 1 will always purchase
item i at this new pricing. Therefore, it is profitable for seller i to deviate and hence p is not
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a pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, the last condition must be satisfied for p to be a pure Nash
equilibrium. J
I Lemma 34. For a pricing p with
∑
i∈N pi = B, if p = pk for some k ∈ [n] ∪ {0} and set
of conditions 2 is satisfied for this k, then p is a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since 0 ≤ pi = pk,i ≤ v1,i ∀i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N pi = B, buyer 1 purchases all the items.
Since pk+1 < v2,k+1, v1,i − pi = v1,k+1 − pk+1 ∀i > k and v1,i − v2,i ≤ v1,k+1 − v2,k+1 we
have that pi < v2,i ∀i > k. As pi v2,i ∀i ∈ [k], all the items are purchased by buyer 2. Since
the market is cleared, no seller has an incentive to the lower the price. Also, since v2,i ≤ 2pi,
a seller with price pi < v2,i has no incentive to increase the price since if the seller i increases
the price, item i will provide the least utility to buyer 1 and hence buyer 1 will not purchase
it. Similarly, if v1,i − 2v2,i ≤ v1,k+1 − pk+1 for some seller i ∈ [k], the seller does not have an
incentive to increase the price since to profit more, the price must be made larger than 2v2,i
at which buyer 1 will not purchase item i.
If v1,i− 2v2,i > v1,k+1− pk+1 for some seller i, the only possible increase in profit is when
seller i sets a price of v1,i ≥ p′i > 2v2,i. Let us assume that buyer 1 purchases a set S containing
i at this new pricing. Let A = [k] \ (S ∪{i}) and C = [n] \ ([k]∪S). Then,∑j∈[n]\{i} p′j < B
and
∑
j∈[n]\{i}(v1,j−p′j) =
∑
j∈A∪C(v1,j−p′j)+
∑
j∈S\{i}(v1,j−p′j) >
∑
j∈S(v1,j−p′j) since
A,C satisfies the condition of the lemma. Therefore, buyer 1 will prefer [n] \ {i} over S.
Thus, this deviation is not profitable. Since no seller has an incentive to deviate, p is a pure
Nash equilibrium. J
The following theorem follows from lemmas 31, 32, 33 and 34.
I Theorem 35. There is a market clearing pure Nash equilibrium if and only if either the
set of conditions 1 is satisfied or the set of conditions 2 is satisfied for some k ∈ [n] ∪ {0}.
Thus, checking all the conditions above is necessary and sufficient to check the existence of
market clearing pure Nash Equilibrium. There are n+ 2 possible market clearing pure Nash
Equilibrium (n+ 1 budget clearing, one for each value of k and one non-budget clearing),
and we can check for all of them using the above conditions. These are the only possible
market clearing pure Nash Equilibria.
